What does a refused certificate mean?

The domain does answer over TLS, and the certificate it presents is not accepted by the public trust store: expired, self-signed, issued for another name, or served with a broken chain. The connection is encrypted, and the browser stops the visitor all the same.

What exactly does this index measure?

The share of .fr domains served over HTTPS with a valid certificate, the share whose certificate is refused, the share answering in clear only, and the share of TLS answers carrying an HSTS header. Read every week on a frozen panel of 15,000 domains drawn from Afnic's open data file.

Why read the domain's certificate rather than the destination's?

Because the address typed is the domain's. A domain redirecting to another host presents its own certificate first, and that is the one the browser judges. Reading the destination's would publish the certificates of the big hosting providers in front of their customers' domains.

Web encryption of the .fr parc

What a browser gets when it opens a .fr address, before the page itself.

At the reading of 21/09/2026, 61.9 % of the .fr domains that answer are served over HTTPS with a certificate the browser accepts.

HTTPS, valid certificate

61.9 %

Refused certificate

8.8 %

Clear only

29.3 %

Impose HTTPS (HSTS)

32.8 %

What stops a visitor

38.1 % of .fr domains stop the visitor before the page: 8.8 % on a certificate the browser refuses, 29.3 % for want of usable TLS.

The two are published apart and read together: they have different causes and produce the same screen, the one asking the visitor to proceed anyway.

Week after week

See the figures as a table

Date	HTTPS, valid certificate
2026-09-21	61.9 %
2026-09-14	61.4 %
2026-09-07	61.1 %
2026-09-05	61.1 %
2026-09-04	61.0 %

Method

The panel: The same panel as the other .fr indices: 15,000 domains drawn at random from Afnic's open data file, which lists the 4,590,553 active .fr domains. The draw orders every domain by the sha256 fingerprint of its name, and the published seed is enough to rebuild it.
The cadence: Every domain is called on Monday, in the weekly sweep that already opens the panel. The panel stays the same from one week to the next: a movement in the series is the parc deciding.
The reading: The verdict comes from a TLS handshake made against port 443 of the drawn domain, and not from the page it ends up serving. A great many .fr domains send their root to another host, and a certificate read after the redirect belongs to the destination: the separate handshake is what guarantees the certificate judged is the domain's own.
The HSTS header: Strict-Transport-Security is counted on the answers that came back over TLS, that is on the ones that could carry it. A site offering HTTPS and a site imposing it are two different claims, and this share publishes the second.
The base: The verdict exists for every domain that answers on the wire, even when the page that follows is refused or errors: a handshake waits for no page. That is 80 % of the panel as read.
The API: GET https://api.stileex.xyz/v1/series/fr/web-encryption-share/latest

Measured on the same panel, in the same weekly sweep: WordPress patch lag in France and What the .fr parc is built on